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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-TIME CHARTER-SHPOWNER'S CONTRACTUAL RIGHT
TO WITHDRAW SERVICES OF VESSEL UPON CHARTERER'S FAILURE TO
PROVIDE PUNCTUAL PAYMENT IS NOT EXTINGUISHED BY LATE TENDER

OF PAYMENT

I.

FACTS ANm HOLDING

In January 1970, Mardorf Peach and Co. hired The Laconia, a
vessel owned by Attica Sea Carriers Corp., on a time charter.1 The
terms of the agreement were set forth in a standard New York
Produce Exchange (NYPE) form.2 The last semimonthly advance
payment fell due on a Sunday, and the charterers tendered payment the following day. 3 The shipowners refused acceptance of the
payment as tardy' and informed the charterers that they were
withdrawing their services from the time charter.' The charterers
1. The agreement was entered into on January 8, 1970. The duration of the
time charter was three months, fifteen days more or less at the option of the
charterers. Payment was to be made by the charterers into the owners' account
with the First National City Bank of New York, branch 34, Moorgate, London,
at a contract rate per calendar month of $3.10 per ton.
2. The NYPE is one of several available standardized forms for use in time
charters. The text of the New York Produce Exchange Government Form 1946 is
reproduced in its entirety in G. GnmoRE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADnmwiTy at
1003-10 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as G. GuLMoRE]. Both the NYPE and the
Uniform Time Charter 1939 (Baltime) are standardized forms best suited for use
with dry cargoes. The Baltime form is utilized to a greater extent in England and
Europe than in the United States. Time charter forms frequently used for tanker
hire include the Mobil Tanker Time Charter Party (Mobiletime) (4-67), the Texaco Tanker Time Charter Party (Texacotime 2) (December 1971), and Tanker
Time Charter Party (STB Time). See Thowbridge, The History, Development,
and Characteristicsof the CharterConcept, 49 TuL. L. REv. 743, 750-51 (1975).
3. The charterers had remitted payment for six of the seven installment obligations in complete satisfaction of the terms of the time charter.
4. A tardy payment would be in breach of clause five of the NYPE, the
relevant portions of which are as follows:
Payment of said hire to be made . . . semi-monthly in advance ...
otherwise failing the punctual and regular payment of the hire ... the
Owners shall be at liberty to withdraw the vessel from the service of the
Charterers ....
G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 1005.
5. The seventh installment fell due on Sunday, April 12, 1970. London banks
are not open for business on Sundays or Saturdays. On Monday morning, the
shipowners' agents telephoned the charterers and informed them that they were
contemplating withdrawal of the vessel's services for breach of payment. The
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submitted to a new agreement for the duration of the original
charter' but simultaneously demanded that the matter be submitted to arbitration.' The arbitrators found that the charterers were
in immediate default by failing to make payment on the business
day immediately preceding the Sunday due date (i.e., Friday), and
that the shipowners were entitled to withdraw their vessel on Monday.' On appeal of an award in the form of a special case, the judge
affirmed the shipowners' right of withdrawal as a matter of law."
The Court of Appeal subsequently reversed and granted leave to
the shipowners to appeal, holding that the charterers had remedied
the breach of contract through payment. 10 The English House of
Lords reversed. Held: In a time charter set forth in a NYPE form,
failure of the charterer to perform by punctual payment accords
the shipowner an immediate right to elect withdrawal of his services which cannot be extinguished by a late tender of payment
by the charterer. Mardorf Peach & Co. v. Attica Sea Carriers
Corp., [1977] A.C. 850.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The mutual obligations between a charterer and shipowner of a
shipowners then asked their bank to inform them when and if payment was
received from the charterers. The charterers instructed their London bank and
had delivered a "payment order" in the full amount of the installment to the
shipowners' bank at approximately 15:00 hours. The payment order was in accordance with the method of the London Currency Settlement Scheme operated
by member banks, and a payment order was regarded by the member banks as
equivalent to cash. Upon receipt of the payment order, the shipowners' bank
began dealing with the payment order in the usual manner and subsequently
informed the shipowners of its receipt by the bank. The shipowners immediately
instructed their bank to refuse and return the payment order. The bank complied
by issuing a return payment order, in favor of the charterer's bank, which it
delivered the following morning. At 18:55 hours on Monday, April 13, the shipowners informed the charterers that services of The Laconia were withdrawn.
6. As of April 13, 1970, the market rate had risen to $5.59 per ton. At the time
of withdrawal, The Laconia was outside Halifax waiting to load cargo for transport to Glasgow. To complete their voyage, the charterers agreed to a rate charge
of $8.00 per ton.
7. An arbitration clause is a standard term in time charters and is included
as paragraph seventeen of the NYPE. See G. GmmORE, supra note 2, at 1007.
8. The text of the arbitration award, in the form of a special case to determine
whether as a matter of law the shipdwners were entitled to withdraw The Laconia
from the charter, is reprinted in Mardorf Peach & Co. v. Attica Sea Carriers Corp.
(The Laconia) [1975] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 634, 635-37 (Q.B.).
9. [1975] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 634.
10. Mardorf Peach & Co. v. Attica Sea Carriers Corp. (The Laconia) [1976]
1 Q.B. 835; [1976] 2 W.L.R. 668; [1976] 2 All E.R. 249.
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vessel for hire are generally set forth in a contractual document
termed a "charter party" or "charter." The historical development
of the oceanic shipping industry has resulted in the standardiza-

tion of types of charter parties, one of which is the time charter.
The legal force of the time charter is in its establishment of sub-

stantive contractual rights. In every time charter, the shipowner
retains a right to elect a withdrawal of the services of his vessel
(i.e., rescission of the contract) upon default of payment by the

charterer. " The rule with regard to when and under what condi-

tions the right to withdraw inures to a shipowner, however, has

been a subject of judicial uncertainty. In The Petrofina,'3 the
House of Lords clarified the controlling English rule as to when the
right to choose to withdraw a vessel's services accrues to a shipowner. The court held that where a due date for payment is stipulated within the time charter, 4 the right to elect a withdrawal
accrues immediately to the shipowner upon obtaining knowledge
of a charterer's failure to pay. 5 The Petrofina specifically noted

that payment a few days late is not timely enough, " and that the
11. In general, there are three main types of charter parties: time charter,
voyage charter, and demise (bareboat) charter. Each form of time charter is
adapted to a specific purpose of the charterer, and custom and usage has standardized the nature of the agreement in each case. See generally G. GULMoRE, supra
note 2, at 193-243; W. PAYNE, CARRAGE OF GOODS BY SEA 9-54 (10th ed. E. Ivamy
1976).
12. See T. SCRUTrON, CHARTERPARTiS AND Bis OF LADING 360-61 (18th ed.
A. Mocatta, M. Mustill & S. Boyd eds. 1974). The substance of a time charter is
that of a contract for the provision of services. The charterer holds the right to
have his cargo carried by a particular vessel. The shipowners, however, maintain
the rights of possession and control of the vessel by retaining master and crew as
employees throughout the duration of the charter. The shipowner must sustain
the dily costs of operation. In leasing his vessel, the shipowner will release profitability of the vessel to the objectives of the charter. To reduce this risk, shipowners in time charters have traditionally received payment in advance for the use
of their vessel.
13. Tankexpress A/S v. Compagnie Financibre Belge des Petroles S.A. (The
Petrofina) [1949] A.C. 76.
14. The relevant portions of the time charter in The Petrofina were as follows:
"By cl. 11: 'Payment of the said hire is to be as follows: In cash, monthly, in
advance, in London. In default of such payment the owners shall have the faculty
of withdrawing the said vessel from the service of the charterers ....
' Id. at
77.
15. Id. at 76.
16. The House of Lords expressly disapproved of dictum in the early English
case of Nova Scotia Steel Co. v. Sutherland Steam Shipping Co., [1899] 6 Com.
Cas. 106, 109 to the effect that where a charter party required regular and punc-
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shipowner's right to elect a withdrawal could be based solely on a
failure to receive due payment, for "neither deliberate nonperformance nor negligence in performing the contract [by the
charterer] is necessary."'" This absolute right of a shipowner to
elect a withdrawal was severely restricted by the English Court of
Appeal in The Georgios C.' The Baltime charter form employed
in The Georgios C was substantially the same as that used in The
Petrofina." The appellate court agreed that under the contract the
shipowners had the right to exercise withdrawal immediately upon
passage of the due date for payment. However, the court also held
that the charterers could thereafter extinguish that right by tender
of payment."0 The charterers were therefore allowed to make a late
payment in satisfaction of the requirement of performance, up
until the time that the shipowners notified them of the election of
the right to withdraw. As Lord Denning, M.R., stated, "I think in
this clause the words 'in default of payment' mean 'in default of
The impact of Lord
payment and so long as default continues.' '"2
the right of
to
modify
was
the
rule
of
interpretation
Denning's
withdrawal of a shipowner. No longer considered absolute, the
right was conditioned upon a charterer's failure to tender payment
during the period of default prior to withdrawal." This extended
construction of the default clause was contrary to the literal analysis of the time charter form employed by the House of Lords in The
Petrofina, and it was not followed in a subsequent case presenting
tual payment, tender of hire two days after due date was permissible. Id. at 91
passim.

17. Id. In the House of Lords, Lord Porter found that a default of payment
had occurred in the charterers' failure to pay the required installment on the due
date. Liability was not assessed, however, as special circumstances (the outbreak
of World War II) delayed receipt of the charterer's dispatched payment.

18. Empresa Cubana de Fletes v. Lagonisi Shipping Co. (The Georgios C)
[19711 1 Q.B. 488.
19. The relevant portions of the Baltime time charter in The Georgios C were
as follows:
In default of payment the owners to have the right of withdrawing the vessel
from the service of the charterers, without noting any protest and without
interference by any court or any other formality whatsoever ....
Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 504 passim.
21. Id.
22. "It seems that the owners have the option-so long as the charterers are

in default-to withdraw the vessel. But, once the charterers remedy their default,
by paying the installment or tendering it, the owners have no right to withdraw."

Id.
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a similar factual situation. In The Brimnes,3 the charter under a
NYPE contract failed to meet the payment due date but subsequently made a later payment. The English Court of Appeal allowed the shipowners to rescind the contract. 4 The Brimnes returned the English rule to that of The Petrofina and added that
the shipowner's absolute right of withdrawal was not affected by a
late tender of payment prior to the election of withdrawal. 5 Although the appellate court in The Brimnes could not overrule The
Georgios C holding, it distinguished the results on the basis of
wording differences in the two time charter forms. " The issue with
respect to when a shipowner acquires the right to withdrawal upon
a failure of payment by a charterer has also been considered in
American tribunals. Even though the standard time charter forms,
such as Baltime and NYPE, are used worldwide, American decisions interpreting the withdrawal clauses in these forms have at
times differed from the English formulations discussed above. The
American interpretations differ on two important points: first,
when payment is required if the due date falls on a nonbusiness
day; and second, whether a charterer's late tender of payment acts
to extinguish the shipowner's right of withdrawal. In a time
charter, installment payments in full are required in advance.
When that payment date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday,
the English and American rules are contrary. The English rule
requires that payment be made on the immediately preceding
business day." The American rule, established in New York arbi23. Tenax Steamship Co. v. Brimnes (Owners) (The Brimnes) [1975] Q.B.
929.
24. Id. at 956.
25. Id. at 953.
26. The distinction was between The Georgios C words "in default of pay-

ment" and The Brimnes (NYPE) words "failing the punctual and regular payment." Id. The instant court found the semantic distinction to be unconvincing
and superfluous. [1977] A.C. at 882, 877.
27. See 37 HALSBURY'S LAWS oF ENGLAND § 172, at 97 (3d ed. 1962), which
provides in part:

Period expiring on Sunday or holiday. The fact that the last day of a
prescribed period is a Sunday or other non-juridical day does not as a
general rule give the person who is called upon to act an extra day; it is no
excuse for his omission to do the act on some prior day.
The rule, however, is subject to exceptions. For example, where scheduled per-

formance of an action in an English court falls upon a Sunday, performance may
be made the following Monday. Pritam Kaur v. S. Russell & Sons, Ltd. [1973]
Q.B. 335. No exception has been judicially declared as to banks, and the point
that bank payment due on a Sunday must be tendered on the preceding Friday

328

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:323

28 is in accord with state busitration in The Maria G. Culucundis,
ness law,29 allowing payment to be made on the following business
day. Concerning a charterer's late tender of an installment payment, the American rule appears less stringent that that provided
in the English case of The Brimnes. While the right to withdraw
immediately accrues to the shipowner (in accord with The
Petrofina), that right may be extinguished by the charterer's subsequent offer of payment. In The U.S. 219,0 the United States
District Court held that an acceptance by the shipowner of a late
payment extinguished the right of withdrawal. This principle was
followed in an arbitration case, The San Juan Venturer,3' where
acceptance of a late payment, even for past and non-advance hire
services, was held to negate a subsequent withdrawal notice by the
shipowners. It is not entirely certain whether withdrawal would be
valid where the shipowner rejects a late tender of payment. In an
early Second Circuit Court of Appeals case, Luckenbach v.
Pierson,2 such a rejection followed by withdrawal by the shipowner
was sanctioned by the court. Luckenbach was followed in the later
case of The Gloria,33 where the shipowner's right to withdraw was
not extinguished by the charterer's late tender of payment. Forceful dictum, however, emphasized that because of the war-time
circumstances involved in The Gloria, it might not be controlling
in normal times. 4 It has not since been cited as authority in any
reported decision.

is generally conceded by counsel. See, e.g., Empresa Cubana de Fletes v. Lagonigi
Shipping Co., [1971] 1 Q.B. 488 (where charterer's claim for continuation of
default was allowed notwithstanding concession of tardiness).

28. China Trading & Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Culucundis, 1954 A.M.C. 325 (Arb.
1952) (Barton, Colesworthy & Dunaif, Arbs.).
29. N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 25(1) (McKinney Supp. 1977) provides in relevant part:
Where a contract by its terms authorizes or requires the payment of
money or the performance of a condition on a Saturday, Sunday or a public
holiday... , unless the contract expressly or impliedly indicates a differ-

ent intent, such payment may be made or condition performed on the next
succeeding business day ....
with the same force and effect as if made
or performed in accordance with the terms of the contract.
30. 21 F. Supp. 466, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1937).

31. Marcona Carriers, Ltd. v. Japan Line, Ltd., 1974 A.M.C. 1053 (Arb. 1974)
(Caldera, Healey & Freehill, Arbs.).
32. 229 F. 130, 132 (2d Cir. 1915).
33. Confederation of Switzerland v. Compania de Vapores Arauco Panamena,
40 F. Supp. 330, 332 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
34. The rationale of the court went to an interpretation of the parties' intent

to strictly comply with the terms of the time charter. The court emphasized that
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III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

In the instant case, each Lord considered the appellate decision
in The Brimnes as controlling.15 The court noted that the same
NYPE form was used in both cases, and that the import of the
withdrawal clause was to provide the shipowner with an immediate right of withdrawal upon failure of payment. The NYPE form
requires "punctual" payment by the charterers. 6 The court, per
Lord Fraser, ruled that the word "punctual" "must have the effect
that the owners will not be deprived of the right of withdrawal by
a tender of unpunctual payment."37 Lord Fraser expressly relied
upon and endorsed the statement of Davis, L.J., in The Brimnes
that "the right to withdraw having undoubtedly arisen, it. was
exercisable by the owners notwithstanding a preceding, but belated, payment of the . . . hire by the charterers." 8 The court

reasoned that the words in the NYPE withdrawal clause were neither difficult nor ambiguous, and that "punctual" was to be applied in its literal sense. 9 The court, per Lord Salmon, noted that
under the English rule, where payment falls due on a nonbusiness
day, punctual payment can only be accomplished on the preceding
business day.'" The court refused to follow The Georgios C by
allowing a successful tender of a late payment, reasoning that such
a payment would simply not be punctual with respect to the
NYPE requirement. The court went further, however, and expressly overruled the holding of the appellate court in The Georgios
C.41 It found that the Baltime form therein employed could not be
easily distinguished from the NYPE form in its wording,4" and it
the increased war-time risk of ship capture, damage, or loss demanded exact
adherence to the advance payment term of the contract. The court noted, however,
In an ordinary case, in ordinary times, I have no doubt -but that a court
might find that the strict compliance with the time of payment required in
this case of libellant would require some further evidence of intention and
a more liberal construction would be given in the light of such ordinary
circumstances.
Id. at 334.

35.

[1977] A.C. at 868, 876, 882, 887.

36.

See note 4 supra.

37. [1977] A.C. at 883.
38. [1975] Q.B. at 953.
39. [1977] A.C. at 867.
40. Id. at 875.
41. Id. at 868-69.
42. See note 26 supra.
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expressly upheld the result in The Petrofina, where essentially the
same form as that in The Georgios C was used." The basis for the
court's holding was that the time charter form contemplates payment for services in advance, and unpunctual payment does not
meet an advance payment requirement. The Lords considered the
hardship their decision might cause to charterers failing to make
payment by the due date, but considered the need for certainty in
commercial dealings and strict contractual interpretation paramount concerns." The court noted that charterers and shipowners
are free to choose from a range of available time charter forms
during their negotiations, and that many of these forms provide
less stringent withdrawal conditions. 5 Additionally, as was suggested by Lord Fraser, the charterers could have insisted upon a
stipulation for notice before withdrawal." By overruling The Georgios C, the court sought to reestablish the absolute right of a shipowner to withdraw his services, under either the Baltime or
NYPE forms, as was provided by the decisions in The Petrofina
and The Brimnes.
IV.

COMMENT

The broad significance of the instant decision in overruling The
Georgios C is to provide a concrete rule with respect to withdrawal
clauses in standardized time charter forms. The rule is relevant to
43. [1977] A.C. at 876-77.
44. The court implicitly noted that it was The Georgios C (1971) appellate
result which interrupted the certain rule of a shipowner's immediate right to
withdrawal. In urging its overruling, Lord Salmon suggested, "My Lords, I hope
that the doubts which have troubled the waters since 1971 will now be finally
dispelled by this decision of your Lordships' House." Id. at 878.
45. In particular, default clauses in other suggested forms included the Barecon "A" ("in default of payment beyond a period of seven running days"), Essotime 1969 ("default of punctual and regular payment as herein specified," allowing a ten day grace period for charterer payment), and Beepeetime 2 (allowing a
seven day grace period). Id. at 869.
46. Id. at 883. See Oceanic Freighters Corp. v. M.V. Libyaville Reederei und
Schiffarhrts G.m.b.H. (The Libyaville) [1975] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 537. The time
charter was drawn on a NYPE form and included the standard default clause in
paragraph five. See note 4 supra. The agreement was amended, however, by
certain "anti-technicality" clauses, the second of which read in part: "'Where
there is any failure to make "punctual and regular payment" . . . , Charterers
shall be given by Owners two banking working days' written notice to rectify the
failure . . . .'" [1975] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. at 550. The owners attempted to
withdraw their vessel's services without complying with the notice provision, and
the court held for the charterers. Id. at 555.
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potential English arbitration and litigation, and it forewarns charterers that any failure to make a due date payment will immediately place them in default. The default is incurable, and the
charterer will thereafter be subject to the whim of the shipowner.
Upon default, the shipowner may either exercise his right of withdrawal within a reasonable time period or accept a late tender of
payment in continuation of the contract. This option of the shipowner is obviously advantageous. In times of rising market rates,
an alert shipowner could monitor the charterer's payment behavior
and immediately withdraw his vessel's services upon a failure of
payment. The shipowner could subsequently enter into a new time
charter at a more profitable market rate. 7 The rule will also work
to the shipowner's advantage in a time of falling market rates.
Given such a condition, the charterer is forced to continue payments at the relatively higher stipulated contract rate or deliberately breach the contract through nonpayment, thus subjecting
himself to an inevitable damages claim. The question therefore
arises as to whether the English rule is well suited to periods of
fluctuating market rates. The instant court was motivated by the
need to instill certainty in time charters executed in England.48 In
particular, the court stressed the fact that the rule in The Georgios
C served only to disrupt the state of commercial affairs in admiralty, to the disadvantage of all participants." Standardized time
charter forms can easily be amended to provide notice provisions
prior to withdrawal, grace periods for payment, or sliding rate
adjustments geared to an objective market rate. Such amended
terms would not be inconsistent with the scope and effect of the
English rule, and the court demonstrated foresight in mentioning
them. 0 The small burden in planning and drafting placed upon the
parties using such amended terms greatly reduces the undesirable
47. This point was presented by counsel for the charterers in The Laconia.

[1977] A.C. at 857-59. It was not considered in the decision of any Lord, however,
suggesting that its relative merit in formulating the rule of law was not significant.
48. The court in The Laconia was undoubtedly influenced in part by the call
for reform by contemporary commentators. See, e.g., Wilson, British Aspects of
CharteringProblems: Some Recent Developments, 49 TUL. L. Rsv. 1063, 1070-72
(1975).
49. "The decision [The Georgios C] seems to have had the unfortunate effect

of causing confusion and uncertainty by introducing verbal distinctions which are

'quite inappropriate to commercial relationship (sic).'" The Laconia, [1977] 1

A.C. at 882.
50. See notes 45 & 46 supra.
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incentive to change behavior during the course of the time charter
in response to market conditions."1 The instant decision may be of
some significance in the interpretation of standardized time
charter forms drawn in the United States. American admiralty
courts sometimes look to English precedent in determining difficult points of law." Litigation relevant to the issue considered in
The Laconia has been rare in American tribunals. The instant
decision serves as an example of a strict contractual interpretation
of withdrawal clauses and could provide limited authority for
American courts in analyzing similar issues in time charters.
Richard F. Cook, Jr.
51. The possibility exists that a charterer might circumvent the strict application of the law established in the instant decision by attempting to analyze a
withdrawal as a forfeiture, thereby invoking equitable relief. A discussion of the
role of equity principles, however, was dismissed in the instant case upon a
procedural point. Counsel for the charterers failed to prepare an argument relying
upon equitable grounds until oral presentation before the House of Lords. The
introduction of an argument seeking to equate a withdrawal with a forefeiture was
disallowed by the high court. [1977] A.C. at 873. Such an approach has been
previously alluded to in similar factual circumstances, but has never been framed
as a major issue. The success of an equity argument is uncertain. Under an
established rule of law, the relationship of the parties will not be influenced by
external factors not creating a situation of frustration, such as market rate variations. See, e.g., Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v. V/O Sovfracht (The Eugenia)
[1964] 2 Q.B. 226, providing an extended interpretation by the English Court of
Appeal of the nature and meaning of frustration in time charters. See also W.
PAYNE, supra note 11, at 47-54. Intervention by equity would probably serve only
to modify the impact of a withdrawal upon the charterer and would not negate
the shipowner's right to withdraw.
52. See, e.g., Confederation of Switzerland v. Compania de Vapores Arauco
Panamena, 40 F. Supp. 330, 333, where the United States District Court did not
hesitate to cite nineteenth century English case law.

ANTITRUST-TREBLE DAMAGES-A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IS A
"PERSON" ENTITLED TO SUE UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE CLAYTON

Ac

I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiffs, sovereigns of several foreign countries,' sued Pfizer,
Inc. (Pfizer) and other pharmaceutical manufacturers,2 alleging a
conspiracy to restrain and monopolize interstate and foreign trade
in the manufacture, distribution and sale of broad spectrum antibiotics in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.3 Among
the violations alleged were price fixing, market division, and fraud
upon the United States Patent Office. Pfizer moved to dismiss the
claims on the ground that the foreign sovereigns were not
"persons" entitled to sue for treble damages under section 4 of the
Clayton Act.' The district court held that a foreign sovereign has
a cause of action under section 4 and certified the question for
interlocutory appeal. 5 The court of appeals, adopting the reasoning

of Georgia v. Evans,6 affirmed. 7 On appeal to the United States

1. The Government of India, the Imperial Government of Iran, and the Republic of the Philippines were respondents in the appeal to the Supreme Court.
The complaint of the Republic of Vietnam had been dismissed on the ground that
the United States no longer recognized that nation's government. Vietnam v.
Pfizer, Inc., 556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977). Claims by the foreign governments as
parenspatriae had been dismissed in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir.
1975). Other suits by Spain, South Korea, West Germany, Colombia, and Kuwait
had been settled or were held pending.
2. Pfizer, Inc., American Cyanamid Co., Bristol-Myers Co., Squibb Corp.,
Olin Corp., and The Upjohn Co., petitioners, were defendants in the district
court.
3. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, §§ 1, 2, 26 Stat. 209; (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976)).
4. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1976)). Section 4 provides that:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor. . . . and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained ....
Section 1 of the Clayton Act provides that
[t]he word "person" or "persons" wherever used in this Act shall be
deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.
Id., § 1, 38 Stat. 730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976)). Cf. Securities Act of 1933,
§ 2(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1976) ("person" includes "a government or political
subdivision thereof").
5. See Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 550 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976).
6. 316 U.S. 159. For a consideration of Evans, see notes 19-22 and accompanying text infra.
7. Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 550 F.2d 396, adopted on rehearingen banc, 550 F.2d
400.
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Supreme Court, affirmed. Held: A foreign sovereign otherwise entitled to sue in this country is a "person" entitled to sue for treble
damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act. Pfizer, Inc. v. India,
434 U.S. 308, 98 S. Ct. 584, 54 L.Ed.2d 563 (1978), rehearingde98 S. Ct. 1462, 55 L.Ed.2d 502 (1978).
nied, - U.S. -,
H.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The right of the domestic sovereign to sue in an action at common law is settled, on the ground that it is capable of owning
property and should be able to protect it.8 Whether the sovereign
is, however, the subject of a statute creating a right or obligation
for a "person" or "persons," depends upon an interpretation of the
particular statute to determine the intent of the legislature.' The
Supreme Court first considered the use of the word "person" in
sections 7 and 8 of the Sherman Act10 in United States v. Cooper

Corporation." The Court adopted a rule of exclusion for the antitrust laws, holding that rights and remedies were available only to

those upon whom they were conferred by the Sherman Act. 2 While
noting that the word "person" generally does not include the sover8. Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 228 (1850) (trespass); Dugan v.
United States, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 172 (1818) (bill of exchange); see United States
v. Gear, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 120 (1845) (trespass).
The sovereign may likewise sue in a common law action when a right is granted
to it by statute. United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U.S. 250 (1911) (action in debt
for a stamp tax due under a War Revenues Act); Dollar Savings Bank v. United
States, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 227 (1873) (action in debt for an internal revenue tax).
9. For cases dealing with this question in other areas, see California v. United
States, 320 U.S. 577, 585-86 (1944) (federal shipping statute applied to state as
owner of wharf); Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 91-92
(1934) (taxation of bond issued by United States); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S.
360, 370 (1934) (federal taxation of a state's commercial activities); Davis v.
Pringle, 268 U.S. 315, 318 (1925) (United States as creditor in bankruptcy); Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 517 (1893); Dollar Savings Bank v. United States,
86 U.S. at 240.
10. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, §§ 7, 8, 26 Stat. 210. The provisions were
reenacted as §§ 4 and 1, respectively, of the Clayton Act. See United States v.
Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 610 (1941); note 4 supra. In 1955, § 7 of the Sherman
Act was repealed as redundant. Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283; see
S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955).
11. 312 U.S. 600. "Person" in the Sherman Act as expressly defined to include
a municipal corporation was considered in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works
v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
12. 312 U.S. at 604. The Court specifically stated: "It is not our function to
engraft on a statute additions which we think the legislature logically might or
should have made." Id. at 605 (citations omitted). See id. at 606.
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eign, the Court held that this was not conclusive,' 3 and gave controlling weight to the intent of Congress, as indicated by "[tihe
purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history,
and the executive interpretation of the statute."' 4 The policy of the
antitrust laws to provide a remedy to victims of antitrust violations, the Court said, was only one of the aids to construction. 5
Considering the Sherman Act, its legislative history, and related
legislation," the Court found that the word "person" was not used
to refer to the United States, but to parties whose characteristics
were those of "natural and artificial persons."' 7 Finally, the Court
noted as significant the failure of the United States to bring an
action for treble damages in fifty years." The Supreme Court next
construed the word "person" in the antitrust laws in Georgia v.
Evans,91 where a state sued for treble damages under section 7. The
Court appeared to invert the presumption in Cooper, that a sovereign will not have a cause of action unless one is conferred by the
13.
14.

312 U.S. at 604-05 (citing United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 321 (1876)).
312 U.S. at 605.

15. Id.

16. The Court in Cooper did not consider § 1 of the Revised Statutes (1874)
(current version at 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)) (definition of "person" last amended in
1948), which supplemented the definition of "person" in § 8 of the Sherman Act
and § 1 of the Clayton Act. In 1871 Congress had enacted this general definitional
statute which provided that "the word 'person' may extend and be applied to
bodies politic and corporate. .

. ."

Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.

The reference to "bodies politic" was deleted when the Revised Statutes were
enacted into positive law to require specific reference in any particular statute in
order to include a state, territory, or foreign government. I RavSiON OF THE UNITED
STATES STATUTES AS DRAFTED BY THE COMMSSIONERS 18 (1872) (Revisers' Note); see
UNITED STATES REVISION OF THE LAws 1 (Report of T.J. Durant, 1873).
It was not clear when the antitrust laws were enacted that the corporation in
§ 1 of the Revised Statutes included foreign corporations. See United States v.
Fox, 94 U.S. at 321; G. ENDLICH, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 118-19 (1888). Congress expanded the definition to "preclude any narrow interpretation," United
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. at 607, and to ensure that foreign corporations
competed on an equal basis with domestic corporations. See 21 CONG. REc. 4472
(1890); 19 CONG. REc. 4409 (1888).
17. 312 U.S. at 606-13. The Court noted that "person" was used in the same
sentence to refer to defendants as well as plaintiffs, and in other sections of the
Sherman Act to refer to one liable to criminal prosecution. Further, the Court
found that the "scheme and structure" of the Sherman Act was to create two
classes of actions: public remedies of injunction, seizure, and criminal prosecution, and a private remedy of treble damages. Id. at 607-08.
18. Id. at 613-14.
19. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
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antitrust laws.20 The Court noted that although a state could not
prosecute antitrust violations, it was otherwise like other purchasers injured by such violations." Observing that to hold otherwise
would be to leave a state without any redress for anticompetitive22
activity, the Court held that a state could sue for treble damages.
Although a foreign sovereign may bring an action in the United
States courts, 3 its right to do so is not absolute, but is based on
comity. 21 The only antitrust suits by foreign sovereigns of record

prior to 1969 were in the early 1960's.2 Foreign commerce is clearly
a subject of the antitrust laws; the acts extend expressly to "trade
or commerce . . . with foreign nations."2 Foreign corporations

may by definition sue and be sued as "persons" under the antitrust
20. See 312 U.S. at 604; note 12 & accompanying text supra.
21. 316 U.S. at 162-63. The Court noted the holding in Cooper that the Sherman Act created one class of action for the federal government and one class for
"other victims" of violations. 316 U.S. at 161-62; see 312 U.S. at 607-10; note 17
supra. Appellant Georgia had argued, "If the word 'person' as used in the statute
excludes the sovereign, the State may yet maintain an action, [because it] has
effectively divested itself of its sovereignty with reference to. . .interstate commerce. . . and is relegated to the status of a private individual." Brief for Appellant at 37, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159.
22. 316 U.S. at 162. Mr. Justice Roberts, who wrote the majority opinion in
Cooper, dissented, arguing that the Court was amending the act on policy grounds
when Congress had not indicated its intent. 316 U.S. at 164.
23. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1964) (conversion); The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164, 167 (1870) (libel); see U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
At the time of the enactment of the Sherman Act, foreign sovereigns brought
actions for unfair competition in the United States courts. See, e.g., French
Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191 U.S. 427 (1903) (France suing for use
and benefit of its citizen-lessee); La Republique Francaise v. Schultz, 94 F. 500
(S.D.N.Y. 1899).
24. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 408-09. This right may
be denied if the foreign sovereign is at war with the United States, but is otherwise
accorded. Id. at 408-12; Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137
(1938). It is circumscribed by other rules of law. See, e.g., Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313, 321-28 (1934) (a state may not be sued without its consent).
25. See Velvel, Antitrust Suits by ForeignNations, 25 CATH. U.L. Rxv. 1 &
n.3, 2 n.5 (1975). These cases were settled; preliminary motions to dismiss for lack
of standing were denied. Id. at 1 n.3.
26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 12 (1976); see United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische
P.F.A. Gesellschaft, 200 F. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), 216 F. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), rev'd
on grounds of mootness, 239 U.S. 466 (1916). The original draft of the Sherman
Act covered only imports. See 21 CONG. REc. 2598 (1890). The statute as enacted
has been held to apply to exports as well. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951); United States v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 961 (D. Mass. 1950).
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laws.2 Beyond this, the intent of Congress to protect foreign consumers, particularly foreign sovereigns, 28 is not clear. 29 The legislative history contains no indication that Congress considered the
inclusion of foreign sovereigns as plaintiffs." The antitrust laws,
moreover, use the word "person" to refer to both plaintiffs and
defendants; 31 therefore, under the Cooper rationale, a plaintiff
must be able to be a defendant. 32 Since at the time of the enactment of the antitrust laws foreign sovereigns were immune from

suit,33 it would follow that they cannot be plaintiffs. Finally, an

effect within the United States is required for recovery under the
27. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
28. Congress, as evidenced by its general definitional statute, see note 16
supra, did not understand the word "person" to include a sovereign. This statute
has been most recently addressed in United States v. U.M.W., 330 U.S. 258
(1947), where the Court said,
The [Norris-LaGuardia] Act does not define "persons." In common usage
that term does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing it will
ordinarily not be construed to do so [citing United States v. Cooper Corp.,
312 U.S. at 604; United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. at 321]. Congress made
express provisions R.S. § 1, 1 U.S.C. § 1, for the term to extend to partnerships and corporations ....

The absence of any comparable provision

extending the term to sovereign governments implies that Congress did not
desire the term to extend to them.
330 U.S. at 275.
29. Several cases hold that neither the remedial nor the deterrent aspect of
treble damages will result in an expansion of the remedy beyond the bounds
intended by Congress. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, U.S. -, 97
S. Ct. 2061, 42 L.Ed.2d 707, rehearing denied, - U.S. -,
98 S. Ct. 243, 54
L.Ed.2d 164 (1977) (disallowing the offensive use of the passing-on doctrine);
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972); United States v.
Cooper, 312 U.S. at 604; Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731 (10th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973). The Court noted the primacy of the
remedial nature of treble damages in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977) ("the treble damage provision. . . is designed
primarily as a remedy").
30. Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 550 F.2d at 399 (concurring opinion), on rehearingen
banc at 400 (dissent). Congress, on the other hand, expressly intended to include
American citizens. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 13898 (1914) (remedy available to
"any citizen of the United States or citizen of the country. . . ."); 21 CONG. REc.
1767-68, 1771, 2564, 2569, 2727 (1890); 20 CONG. REc. 1457 (1889); 19 CONG. REc.
192, 4401 (1888). The Court noted this view in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo BowlO-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 486 n.10 (citing 21 CONG. Rc. 1767 (1890)).
31. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 15 (1976).
32. See 312 U.S. at 606.
33. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586-89 (1943); The Exchange, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116, 135-36 (1812).
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antitrust laws.34 The legislative history of the Webb-Pomerene
Act,3 5 which created an exception to the antitrust laws for joint
export associations whose actions have no effect in the United
States, 6 indicates that Congress was not concerned with monopolies affecting only foreign consumers, 7 but desired to affirm that
the antitrust laws did not regulate such activity. 8
I.

THE INSTANT OPINION

The instant Court began its opinion by noting that Congress had
not considered the question of standing for foreign sovereigns at
the time the Sherman and Clayton Acts were enacted. It found,
moreover, that Congress had intended the phrase "any person" to
have "its naturally broad and inclusive meaning," and that the
expansive remedial purpose of the antitrust laws precluded a
"technical or semantic approach" to the definition, citing the
Cooper formula for statutory interpretation. 9 The Court thus
framed the issue as whether a foreign sovereign possessed any characteristics that might exclude it from the protection of the antitrust laws. The majority found first that being foreign did not itself
exclude a plaintiff, noting the extension of the antitrust acts to
trade with foreign nations, and the inclusion of foreign corporations as persons under the acts. 0 Conceding that the primary purpose of the antitrust laws was to protect the American consumer,
the Court further noted that the remedy accorded foreign plaintiffs
34. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945)
(court of appeals sitting as court of last resort). See generally W. FUGATE, FOREIGN
COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 29-74 (2d ed. 1973).
35. Act of April 10, 1918, ch. 50, §§ 1-5, 40 Stat. 516 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 61.65 (1976)).
36. See United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199,
207.08 (1968).
37. See id.; 1 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON COOPERATION IN AMERICAN EXPORT TRADE 9 (1916); Hearingson H.R. 16707 before the House Committee
on the Judiciary,64th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1916).
38. There was some question whether acts which had no effect in the United
States were violations of the antitrust laws. See H.R. REP. No. 50, 65th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1917); K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESs ABROAD 105-

06 (1958).
39.

See text at note 14 supra.

40. Describing the Webb-Pomerene Act as "a narrow and carefully limited
exception to the antitrust laws for certain export activity", the Court concluded

that a rule excluding all foreign plaintiffs would be inconsistent with Congress'
intent that the antitrust laws be generally applied to foreign commerce.

Spring 19781

RECENT DECISIONS

would contribute to the protection of Americans. 4 ' The Court similarly determined that a sovereign was not excluded from antitrust
protection by reason of its sovereignty. Distinguishing United
States v. Fox as a construction of New York law, the Court found
that Congress had not understood the definition of "person" as
clearly excluding sovereign governments.4 2 The majority further
explained that cases decided at the time the Sherman Act was
enacted generally held that the sovereign was entitled to the benefit of a statute extending a right to persons, and that cases construing federal statutes of that era did not invariably imply an intent
to exclude the sovereign. 3 The Court noted that United States v.
Cooper had rejected a hard and fast rule of exclusion of governments as persons, considering "all other available aids to construction" of the antitrust laws." The Court emphasized that the holding in Cooper was based upon Congress' affirmative intent to exclude the United States as plaintiff. The Court next applied the
holding in Georgia v. Evans to foreign sovereigns, reasoning that,
just as a state or individual, a foreign sovereign can be injured by
anticompetitive practices and is without alternative remedies such
as those provided to the United States.45 The majority concluded
that permitting a foreign sovereign to sue under the antitrust laws
was merely an application of the "long-settled general rule" that
a foreign sovereign is entitled to prosecute its claims upon the same
basis as a domestic individual or corporation,46 and noted that its
41. The Court emphasized that, without actions by foreign plaintiffs, the
deterrent effect of the treble damages remedy would be reduced, thereby encouraging companies to violate the law, having the expectation of "illegal profits"
abroad offsetting liability for domestic violations. Thus, domestic consumers

would be benefitted by the maximum deterrent effect of the assessment of the
full costs of antitrust violations.
42. U.S. at n.15, 98 S. Ct. at 589 n.15, 54 L.Ed.2d at 563 n.15. The
Court did not consider Congress' general definitional statute, see note 16 supra,
though Pfizer argued to the Court the effect of this statute and its treatment in
United States v. U.M.W., see note 28 supra. Brief for Petitioner at 19-20, 21,
Pfizer, Inc. v. India, - U.S. -, 98 S. Ct. 584, 54 L.Ed.2d 502.
43. U.S. at n.15, 98 S. Ct. at 589 n.15, 54 L.Ed.2d at 563 n.15.
44. The Court likewise noted that in ChattanoogaFoundry & Pipe Works, a
city was held to be a "person". "without extended discussion." See note 11 supra.
45. The Court argued that a foreign sovereign's ability to participate in a
cartel or boycott to counter anticompetitive practices, as was suggested by the
dissent, was a remedy "hardly available to a foreign nation faced with monopolis-

tic control of the supply of medicines needed for the health and safety of its
people."
46. For the general rule of comity the Court cited Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
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holding that a foreign sovereign can sue for treble damages in no
way involved the Court in foreign policy, affirming "complete judicial deference" to the policy of the executive branch. The dissent,
written by Chief Justice Burger,47 observed that the language of the
statute did not support the majority's result, finding that the discrimination between foreign corporations and sovereigns was based
on the immunity from suit of foreign sovereigns when the acts were
passed, that Congress' concern with foreign commerce did not entail a desire to protect foreign sovereigns, and that the legislative
history of the Webb-Pomerene Act demonstrated Congress' desire
to protect American consumers even at the expense of foreign consumers. The dissent stated that the absence of legislative history
on the question was the best argument for leaving the decision to
Congress. 8 It next challenged the majority's interpretation of
Georgia v. Evans, noting that the states act on behalf of American
citizens when they bring antitrust claims, and that they had given
up their right to regulate antitrust violations under the commerce
and supremacy clauses. The dissent claimed that to apply the
Evans reasoning to such a different situation was to substitute a
"hard and fast rule of inclusion," eschewed in both Evans and
Cooper, noting that foreign sovereigns in bringing antitrust suits
contribute at best indirectly to the protection of American consumers, and remain free to enact their own antitrust laws. Foreign
sovereigns, moreover, often hold economic ideologies and interests
in conflict with those of the United States, and can employ political and commercial weapons against American business. Finally,
it was noted that the primary purpose of the act is remedial, and
that to permit suits by foreign sovereigns on the basis of a maximum deterrent effect is to reverse the priority of purposes of the
antitrust laws on the basis of uninformed speculation. The dissent
said that in areas of less political delicacy, the Court had been
unwilling to go so far.49
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 408-09; Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. at 323 n.2; The
Sapphire, 78 U.S. at 167; and U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Court noted
that, at the time of the enactment of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, a foreign
sovereign could bring actions for unfair competition, "similar in general nature
to antitrust claims," citing French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191
U.S. 472; and La Republique Francaise v. Schultz, 94 F. 500.
47. Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined in the Chief Justice's dissent.
48. Mr. Justice Powell, dissenting in a separate opinion, said that the question
was one of "general policy" upon which the Court had not been given direction

by Congress, and that Congress alone had the ability to decide the questions of
foreign policy and economic welfare.

49. The dissent cited Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 264-65, which
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IV.

COMMENT

The conflicting inferences which may be drawn from the policy
considerations advanced by the Court in the instant case indicate
that the decision to grant standing to foreign sovereigns should be
left to Congress. 0 On the other hand, the economic effect of the
decision is consistent with the purpose of the antitrust laws to
maintain free competition. In the instant case, Pfizer's anticompetitive activity had an effect both in the United States and abroad;
the Court was thus able to find that suit by a foreign sovereign
would deter antitrust violations to the benefit of American consumers. Where there is no effect in the United States, however,
such a suit would have only a detrimental effect on the economy
as a whole, resulting in a flow of money out of the economy, without detering anticompetitive activity which injures Americans.
Permitting.suit by foreign sovereigns supports the posture of the
United States as a proponent of free enterprise, and contributes to
a healthy world economy which will provide access for American
companies to markets and to raw materials.' On the other hand,
while it may be equitable to extend standing to many foreign sovereigns, it is unfair to American interests to permit suit by other
more powerful sovereigns who may be involved in their own anticompetitive activity. 2 The effects of this activity would be felt
held that a state may not bring an action as parens patriae. Cf. note 29 supra
(expansion based on nature of remedy).
50. On February 6, 1978, Senators DeConcini, Thurmond and Allen (Ala.)

introduced a bill, the Antitrust Reciprocity Act, which would limit the standing
of a foreign sovereign to sue under the antitrust laws. See S. 2486, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., § 2, 124 CONG. REc. 1189, 1190-91 (1978) (to Judiciary). The bill provides
for actual damages to foreign sovereigns, subject to two criteria:
(b) No foreign sovereign may bring an action in any court of the United
States under the authority of this section unless the Attorney General of the
United States certifies to the relevant court that(1) the United States is entitled to sue in its own name and on its own
behalf on a civil claim in the courts of such foreign sovereign; and
(2) such foreign sovereign by its laws prohibits restrictive trade practices.
Id., § 2(b), 124 CONG. REc. at 1191. Senator DeConcini remarked that the bill
would permit suit only by countries which have "demonstrated a commitment
to the concepts embodied" in the United States antitrust laws. 124 CONG. REC.
at 1190.
51. For a collection of essays on the relationship of the antitrust laws and

foreign commerce, see J. BURNS, A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS 161-251 (1958).
52. The proposed Antitrust Reciprocity Act does not address the case of a
foreign sovereign which is itself involved in an international cartel, while having

on its books a statute prohibiting such activity by resident corporations.

342

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:333

both by the domestic economy and by American companies
abroad. 3 The Court has heretofore been unwilling to extend antitrust protection beyond the bounds intended by Congress." While
stating that it had no legislative guidance, the Court ignored Congress' general definitional statute and the treatment of that statute
in United States v. United Mine'Workers,55 and relied on the most
general indicia of legislative intent. If any class of foreign sovereigns is not to be accorded standing under the proposed Antitrust
Reciprocity Act, its characteristics should be clearly set out in the
statute and its legislative history.
Edward Cage Brewer, HI
53.
is the
54.
55.

The most notable example of anticompetitive activity by foreign nations
cartel of the oil-producing countries.
See note 29 supra.
See notes 16 & 28 supra.

CUSTOMS SEARCH OF INTERNATIONAL MAIL-A CusTOMS SEARCH OF INTERNATIONAL MAIL IS AUTHORIZED BY 19 C.F.R.
§ 145.2 AND INCORPORATES THE REASONABLE CAUSE TO SUSPECT
REQUIREMENT OF 19 U.S.C. § 482

I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Appellants, two naturalized American citizens, petitioned the
district court for a declaration that customs officials had unlawfully searched letters sent to them from Holland and for an injunction to prevent a repetition of similar acts.1 The complaint alleged
that three first class letters, addressed to appellants in California,
were opened by customs officials without appellants' prior knowledge or consent, without any cause to suspect that the letters contained contraband or dutiable merchandise, and without probable
cause or a warrant. 2 The appellants argued that the search violated
both 19 U.S.C. § 482,3 which requires customs officials to have
reasonable cause to suspect that the letter contains contraband or
dutiable merchandise, and their rights guaranteed by the First and
Fourth Amendments. 4 The government moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that no claim for relief had been or could be
stated on the alleged facts.' The district court granted the motion,
holding that any constitutional requirement of reasonable suspi1. DeVries v. Acree, 565 F.2d 577, 578 (9th Cir. 1977).
2.

Id.

3.

19 U.S.C. § 482 (1976).

§ 482.

Search of vehicles and persons.

Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may
stop, search, and examine, as well without as within their respective dis-

tricts, any vehicle beast or person, on which or whom he or they shall
suspect there is merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have been
introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether
by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle or
beast, or otherwise, and to search any trunk or envelope, wherever found,
in which he may have a reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise
which was imported contrary to law; and if any such officer or other person
so authorized shall find any merchandise on or about any such vehicle,
beast, or person, or in any such trunk or envelope, which he shall have
reasonable cause to believe is subject to duty, or to have been unlawfully
introduced into the United States, whether by the person in possession or
charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle, beast, or otherwise, he shall seize
and secure the same for trial. R.S. § 3061.
4. DeVries v. Acree, 565 F.2d 577, 578 (9th Cir. 1977).
5. Id. The facts were accepted as true for purposes of the motion. Brief for
Appellee, at 1.
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cion is automatically supplied by the mere entry of a letter into the
United States.' The district court also accepted the government's
contention that the customs officers' search was authorized by 19
U.S.C. § 15821 and its implementing regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 145.2,8
which did not require customs officials to have reasonable cause
to suspect that the letter contained contraband or dutiable merchandise? On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, held,
reversed. The inspection of international mail by customs officials
is governed by 19 C.F.R. § 145.2. It is a regulation implementing
19 U.S.C. § 482 and it therefore incorporates the "reasonable cause
to suspect" test contained in that statute.' 0 DeVries v. Acree, 565
F.2d 577 (1977).
11.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment prohibits both warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures." Border searches have been recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement since the enactment of the first customs statute in 1789.12 Numerous factors have
been offered to justify this exception, including its longstanding
6. DeVries v. Acree, 565 F.2d, 577, 578 (9th Cir. 1977).
7. Id. 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1976).
§ 1582. Search of persons and baggage; regulations.
The Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe regulations for the search
of persons and baggage and he is authorized to employ female inspectors
for the examination and search of persons of their own sex; and all persons
coming into the United States from foreign countries shall be liable to
detention and search by authorized officers or agents of the Government
under such regulations.
8. 19 C.F.R. § 145.2 (1977).
§ 145.2 Mail subject to Customs examination.
All mail originating outside the Customs territory of the United States,
whether sealed or unsealed, is subject to Customs examination, except
... .[Various diplomatic and official exemptions are cited].
9. DeVries v. Acree, 565 F.2d 577, 578-79 (9th Cir. 1977).
10. Id.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
12. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 43. This statute was enacted by
the same Congress which proposed the Bill of Rights. This fact has been cited to
help justify the border exception. U.S. v. Ramsey, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 1979 (1977).
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history,' 3 the expectation of border searches,' 4 the governmental
interest in controlling contraband,'" and the impracticality of obtaining large numbers of warrants efficiently.'" The governmental
interests served by the exception include the interception of contraband,' 7 the collection of customs duties 8 and the exclusion of
illegal aliens."9 Courts reviewing border searches of international
mail have relied on either 19 U.S.C. § 48220 or § 158221 as authorizing warrantless searches. The regulations generally recognized as
implementing this statutory authority2 are 19 C.F.R. § 145.2 and
39 C.F.R. § 61.1.23 If § 482 is found to be the authorizing statute,
its "reasonable cause to suspect" contraband or dutiable merchandise requirement is incorporated in its implementing regulations. 2
If § 1582 is held to be the authorizing legislation, no such statutory
requirement is imposed. 2 All border searches are subject to the
Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonableness regardless of
any additional statutory limitations. 21 In United States v. Doe,2
the court reviewed the search of a package from Columbia that was
13. U.S. v. Ramsey, 97 S. Ct. 1972, 1981 (1977).
14. U.S. v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982, 984 (2d Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Sohnen, 298F. Supp.
51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
15. U.S. v. Sohnen, 298 F. Supp. 51, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
16. U.S. v. King, 517 F.2d 350, 353 (5th Cir. 1975).
17. U.S. v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film. 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973).
18. U.S. v. Ramsey, 97 S. Ct. 1972, 1981 (1977).
19. Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S., 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
20. U.S. v. Ramsey, 97 S. Ct. 1972 (1977).
21. U.S. v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1088 (1974).
22. U.S. v. Ramsey, 97 S. Ct. 1972, 1976-78 (1977).
23. For text of 19 C.F.R. § 145.2, see note 8 supra.
Postal Service Publication 42 has replaced Parts 11-74 of 39 C.F.R. Chapter I.
These parts, including the former 39 C.F.R. § 61.1, have been incorporated by
reference to C.F.R. by a document published at 41 Fed. Reg. 35,682 (1976).
39 C.F.R. §§ 10.1-3 provide information on the availability of Postal Service
Publication 42.
39 C.F.R. § 61.1 provided:
§ 61.1 What is subject to examination.
All mail originating outside the Customs territory of the United States is
subject to customs examination, except [various diplomatic and official
government exceptions are listed].
24. Id.
25. U.S. v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148, 150-51 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1088 (7th Cir. 1974).
26. U.S. v. Ramsey, 97 S. Ct. 1972, 1979 (1977); Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132,
146-47 (1924).
27. 472 F.2d 982 (2nd Cir. 1973).
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found to contain cocaine. The Doe court stated that "mere suspicion" was sufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's standard
of reasonableness."8 The Doe court than applied § 482 and held
that the "reasonable cause to suspect" standard was to be construed as providing no greater constraint on customs officials than
the Fourth Amendment."9 According to the Doe court, any other
construction would preclude effective enforcement of the customs
laws and would do violence to congressional intent."0 In United
States v. Odland,3 ' the Seventh Circuit held that § 1582 and its
implementing regulation 19 C.F.R. § 61.1 authorized the search of
a greeting card from Colombia.32 Under § 61.1, the envelope was
"subject to search at the border merely because it was entering the
United States from abroad; no other fact, and no suspicion particular to this envelope, is necessary . . . . -3 The court also found
that the same mere entry standard satisfied the Fourth Amendment.34 In United States v. Ramsey 3 the Supreme Court found
that specific language of § 48236 was applicable to a border search
of international mail and that § 145.2 and § 61.131 were its implementing regulations. Justice Rehnquist expressly declined to decide whether § 1582 or other language of § 482 provided additional
authority. The "reasonable cause to suspect" test of § 482 was
found to be "a practical test which imposes a less stringent requirement than that of 'probable cause' imposed by the Fourth Amend28. Id. at 984.
29. Id. at 984-85. The court's holding was based on the unintrusive nature of
mail search, the expectation of search and the governmental interest in enforcing
customs laws. Applying this standard, a satisfaction of the Fourth Amendment
automatically complies with § 482.
30. Id. at 985.
31. 502 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088.
32. Id. at 150.
33. Id. at 150-51.
34. Id. at 151.
35. 97 S. Ct. 1972 (1977).
36. Id. at 1976. "Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search
vessels may ... search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may
have a reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was imported
contrary to law.

..

."

37. Id. at 1976-77.
38. Id. at 1978 n.10. The Court's limited holding prevented Odland and similar § 1582 cases from being overruled.
39. Id. at 1977-78. "Probable cause" is the Fourth Amendment standard required for search warrants. It is a stricter standard than "reasonable cause to
suspect."
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ment ... ."I' Addressing itself to the Fourth Amendment challenge to the search, the Court stated "that searches made at the
border, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur
at the border ... ."40 The Court rejected the argument that a

combination of First and Fourth Amendment rights requires that
a warrant be obtained before first class letters are searched at the
border." Since the customs official was found to have probable
cause 2 for the search, the Court did not have to articulate the
requirements of the "reasonable cause to suspect" test or the interaction of this test with the Fourth Amendment. 3 Ramsey has provided some guidance, but it has not answered all questions.
III.

THE INSTANT DECISION

In the instant case the Ninth Circuit held that 19 C.F.R. § 145.2
implements 19 U.S.C. § 482 and necessarily incorporates the statute's "reasonable cause to suspect" test.4 4 According to the instant
court, 19 U.S.C. § 1582 is inapplicable to the search of international mail or envelopes and nothing in its history or language
suggests otherwise. 45 The court noted that the district court may
have been misled by United States v. Barclift0 when it relied on
§ 1582 as authorizing § 145.2. 41 The court distinguished Barclift as
being limited to the issue of the constitutionality of § 145.2. 4s The
court, basing its holding on a violation of § 482, found it unnecessary to discuss possible violations of the First or Fourth Amendments. 41 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Kilkenny asserted that
§ 1581, rather than § 482, authorizes § 145.2.1o After examining
the parent statute of §§ 1581, 1582 and 482 and its subsequent
history, the dissenting Judge concluded that only §§ 1581 and
40.

Id. at 1979.

41.

Id. at 1982-83.

42. Id. at 1978 n.9. A finding of "probable cause" means that a "reasonable
cause to suspect" is necessarily present.
43. Id. at 1978-79.
44. DeVries v. Acree, 565 F.2d 577, 578 (9th Cir. 1977).
45. Id. at 579.
46. U.S. v. Barclift, 514 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
842. Barclift, also decided by the Ninth Circuit, concerned a constitutional

challenge to § 145.2. The court never specified which statute authorized § 145.2,
although its opinion was interpreted by the district court as supporting § 1582.

47. DeVries v. Acree, 565 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1977).
48.

Id.

49. Id.
50.

Id. (Kilkenny, J., dissenting) at 579-82.
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1582 are applicable to border searches. 5' Since § 482 is limited to
the search of items which have already been introduced into the
United States, it has nothing to do with searches at the border.52
Judge Kilkenny noted that § 145.1(c) defines the word "package"
which is found in § 1581 but not in § 482.13 These considerations,
combined with the pressing need to prevent drug smuggling, lead
Judge Kilkenny to conclude that § § 1581 and 1582 are the authorizing statutes of §§ 145.1 and 145.2 and therefore a "reasonable
cause to suspect" is not a statutory requirement for a search of
international mail at the border." Relying on Ramsey, the Judge
disposed of the First and Fourth Amendment challenges. 5 Judge
Kilkenny stated that mere entry into this country makes a search
reasonable, and that First Amendment rights are adequately protected by 19 C.F.R. § 145.3,56 which prohibits the reading of mail
without a search warrant. 5 Therefore, Judge Kilkenny concluded
that the majority was wrong in holding that § 145.2 implements §
482 and incorporates its "reasonable cause to suspect" requirement for searches of international mail at the border. 8
IV.

COMMENT

The instant case is one of the few situations in which it has been
necessary for a court to define carefully the statutory standard for
a border search of international mail. Earlier decisions have failed
to provide a generally acceptable outline of the appropriate standard. A resolution is provided by an examination of the purposes
of the statutes and the conflicting private interests. Customs officials must be provided with adequate authority to intercept con51. Id. at 581. The judge notes that § 1581 is a more general border search
statute while § 482 is specifically designed to apprehend smugglers after they have
successfully crossed the border. The fact that the contraband is already in the
country justifies the higher standard of § 482.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 582.
54. Id.

55. Id. at 582-83.
56. Id. at 583. 19 C.F.R. § 145.3 (1977).
§ 145.3 Reading of correspondence prohibited.

No customs officer or employee shall read or authorize or allow any other
person to read any correspondence contained in sealed letter mail of foreign
origin unless a search warrant has been obtained in advance from appropriate judge or U.S. magistrate which authorizes such action.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 579.
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traband and collect duties. Procedures for searching mail should
not be needlessly complicated or time consuming. On the other
hand, individuals have a legitimate concern that their mail be free
from arbitrary or groundless searches. The preference of both the
Ramsey and DeVries courts for § 482 and its "reasonable cause to
suspect" test would seem to provide a rational balancing of the
conflicting interests. Government officials should not be authorized to search mail when there is no indication that the mail violates any law. This type of search would be wasteful and would
have no rational expectation of furthering any governmental interest. It has been suggested the border search exception should not
be construed more broadly than necessary to accomplish legitimate goals.59 As Justice Powell stated in the Ramsey concurrence,
the § 482 "reasonable cause to suspect" standard adequately protects constitutional rights." An amendment to 19 C.F.R. § 145.3,61
proposed by the Treasury in response to the Ramsey decision,
reaffirms the reliance on § 482 and the assertion that the
"reasonable cause to suspect" requirement is not unduly burdensome.2" The proposal would require officials to obtain a search
warrant before any letter which appears to contain only correspondence could be searched.63 If a letter "appears to contain matter
in addition to, or other than, correspondence, . . . reasonable

cause to suspect"64 dutiable merchandise or contraband is neces59. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975).
60. U.S. v. Ramsey, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 1983 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
61. 42 Fed. Reg. 38,393 (1977).
§ 145.3 Opening of Sealed Letter Mail; Reading of Correspondence Prohibited.
(a) No Customs officer or employee shall open sealed letter mail which
appears to contain only correspondence unless a search warrant has been
obtained in advance of the opening from an appropriate judge or U.S.
magistrate authorizing that action.
(b) Customs officers or employees may open and examine sealed letter
mail arriving from outside the Customs territory of the United States (or
from outside the Virgin Islands in the case of examinations within the
Virgin Islands) which appears to contain matter in addition to, or other
than, correspondence, provided they have reasonable cause to suspect the
presence of merchandise or contraband.
(c) No Customs officer or employee shall read or authorize or allow
any other person to read any correspondence contained in sealed letter
mail unless a search warrant has been obtained in advance from an appropriate judge or U.S. magistrate authorizing that action.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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sary to justify a search. In the accompanying proposed policy statement, the Treasury provides criteria that can establish a
"reasonable cause to suspect." 5 The proposal is consistent with
the DeVries decision and suggests the Treasury is content with the
application of § 482 and the "reasonable cause to suspect" standard." Promulgation of this amendment would provide the needed
clarification of the requirement for a customs search of international mail. This standard provides a reasonable balancing of the
competing interests of all concerned and should, if accepted, avoid
conflicts similar to the instant case.
Daniel R. Wofsey
65. Id. at 38,394. In the appendix Section B, the following factors are illustrative of factors that can provide reasonable cause to suspect:
(1) A detector dog has alerted officials.
(2) X-ray or spectroscopic examination.
(3) The weight, shape or feel of a letter.
(4) A tip from a dependable outside source.
(5) The letter is insured.
(6) The mail or article is a box, carton or wrapper.
(7) The sender is a known mailer of merchandise or contraband.
The following factors are not sufficient to constitute reasonable cause to suspect:
(1) The mail article is registered.
(2) The letter appears to contain one or a limited number of photographs.
(3) The letter is part of a mass mailing.
(4) The mail article is from a known source country of contraband.
66. Application of the proposed amendment to the facts of the instant case
suggests that a search should not have been conducted without a warrant. Section
145.2(a) would prohibit the opening of "sealed letter mail which appears to contain only correspondence unless a search warrant has been obtained." Even
though one of the letters contained photographs, absent any other suspicious
characteristics, a warrant would be required. Appendix Sec. B at 38,494.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE-DIsCOVERY-PARTY
UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY ORDER WHICH CONTRAVENES
FOREIGN NONDISCLOSURE LAW IS NOT IN CONTEMPT OF COURT

I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Rio Algom, a Delaware corporation maintaining corporate offices in Canada,1 appealed an order adjudging it and its president 2
to be in willful and inexcusable civil contempt of court for failure
to comply with a discovery order issued on behalf of Westinghouse
Electric Corporation as defendant in a separate action. 3 Although
Rio Algom complied with the subpoena duces tecum in numerous
particulars, it objected to Westinghouse's request for production of
business documents located in its Toronto offices, and to producing its president for deposition concerning those records. The basis
for objection was the company's belief that if it produced the business records located in Canada, and if it allowed its president to
be deposed concerning those records, it would subject itself to
criminal prosecution for violation of the Canadian Uranium Securities Regulations.4 In an attempt to fully comply with the discovery
order without violating the Regulations, Rio Algom had requested
the consent of Canadian officials to release the controversial
records.5 That request was denied, as had been letters rogatory6
1. Rio Algom Corporation operates a uranium mine in Utah. It is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Rio Algom, Ltd., a Canadian corporation having its principal
place of business in Toronto. Rio Algom, Ltd. is in turn a subsidiary of Rio Tinte
Corporation, Ltd., head of a worldwide mining conglomerate headquartered in
London.
2. The president of Rio Algom Corporation is George Albino, a resident of
Canada whose citizenship as either American or Canadian is contested by the
parties.
3. Westinghouse Electric Corporation was the defendant in a civil action for
breach of contract to deliver uranium to several utility companies who brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
Westinghouse's defense of "commercial impracticability" under the Uniform
Commercial Code turned on the issue of whether an 800% increase in the price of
uranium was caused by secret price-fixing. The instant case arose when Westinghouse sought to buttress its allegation of price-fixing through discovery procedures aimed at Rio Algom and other foreign and domestic uranium producers.
4. The Uranium Information Security Regulations, S.O.R. 76-644 (Sept. 21,
1976), 110 Can. Gaz. Part II at 2747 (1976), were promulgated under the authority
of Canada's Atomic Energy Control Act, § 9, CAN. Rxv. STAT. Cn. A-19 (1970).
5. In a letter to the Honourable Alistair Gillespie, Minister of the Department
of Energy, Mines and Resources, June 23, 1977, Rio Algom's counsel explained
its dilemma and requested formal waiver of the nondisclosure provisions of the
Uranium Security Regulations. 563 F.2d at 999.
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issued by Westinghouse to the Supreme Court of Ontario seeking
judicial aid in obtaining the records and deposition of Rio Algom's
president. The district court then ordered Rio Algom to show
cause why it should not be held in contempt of court for failure to
comply with an order to satisfy the subpoena.' Based on the finding that Rio Algom had not acted in good faith, the district court
entered a written order of contempt.? On appeal to the court of
appeals, order vacated. Held: Where a party subject to discovery
order asserts inability to comply as a consequence of nondisclosure
laws of the country in which documents are located, a reviewing
court must consider the party's good faith efforts at compliance,
the legal obstacles to compliance, and the relative interests of both
parties and nations involved in deciding whether and how to fashion sanctions for noncompliance. In re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts Ligitation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir.
1977).
H.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant courts broad discretion in formulating and imposing sanctions for failure to comply
with discovery requests.10 When discovery orders from federal
courts compel behavior which conflicts with foreign law, the policy
6. Aletter rogatory is the method by which one country, speaking through one
of its courts, requests another country, acting through its courts by the methods
of court procedure peculiar to it and within its control, to assist the administration of justice in the former country. The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. La.
1941) (citing BLACK's LAW DIMONARY, 1050 (4th ed. rev. 1975)).
7. The Supreme Court of Ontario declined to enforce Westinghouse's letters
rogatory on the ground that release of the business records sought would violate
the Uranium Information Security Regulations, which were promulgated in 1976
under the authority of Canada's Atomic Energy Control Act. The Ontario court
also felt that enforcement of the letters would tend to impinge on Canada's
sovereignty. In re Westinghouse Electric Corp., 16 Ont.2d 273 (1977).
8. Hearings were held before the United States District Court for the District
of Utah, Central Division, on June 21 and July 29, 1977, reviewing a discovery
order issued May 2, 1977.
9. The contempt order directed Rio Algom to pay $10,000 per day until it had
complied fully with the subpoena and subjected corporate property in Utah to
seizure in the event that the fine was not paid.
10. Rule 37(a) lists possible sanctions for failure to comply with an order, and
grants courts the power to "make such orders in regard to the failure as are just
.
." Suggested sanctions include issuance of contempt of court orders, rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party, and drawing negative inferences of fact against the party failing to disclose probative information.
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supporting effective discovery procedures and the principle of "law
of the
forum"" compete with considerations of international comity 12 and fairness to the individual.' 3 The authoritative blueprint
for resolving this tension is Societ6 InternationalePourParticipations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers.'4 The plaintiff in
that case, a Swiss holding company seeking return of property
seized during World War II under the Trading With the Enemy
Act, claimed inability to comply with a discovery order for banking
records on the ground that to do so would violate Swiss penal law."
In reviewing the lower court's dismissal of the case for plaintiff's
failure to comply, the Supreme Court distinguished between two

issues affecting enforcement of discovery requests where compliance would violate foreign law: (1) whether a person had "control"
over the information sought within the meaning of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 34, so as to render a compliance order appropriate;
11. The principle that matters of procedure and remedy are determined by
the law of the forum. Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 129 (1882); Societ6
Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953), modified and aff'd sub nom, Societ6
Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Brownell, 224 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956).
The district court in Societ6 said:
Procedures of the law of the forum customarily govern law suits ....

It

seems obvious that foreign law cannot be permitted to obstruct the investigation and discovery of facts in a case, under rules established as conducive
to the proper and orderly administration of justice in a court of the United
States.
111 F. Supp. at 444.
12. "International comity" is the principle that one nation will respect the
laws of another in recognition of its sovereignty. For a discussion of various definitions of the principle, see Note, OrderingProductionof Documents from Abroad
in Violation of ForeignLaw, 31 U. Cm. L. Rav. 791, 794-95 (1964).
13. In an opinion written one year before the decision in the instant case, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote: "The dilemma is the accommodation of
the principles of the law of the forum with concepts of due process and international comity." Arthur Anderson & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir.
1976). The Societ6 court raised, but did not resolve, the possibility of denial of
due process when a party is punished for good faith inability to comply. 111 F.
Supp. at 446, 447.
14. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
15. The United States government moved under Rule 34 for an order requiring
the plaintiff to produce certain banking records. The plaintiff conceded the relevance of the documents, but petitioned for relief from the production order on the
ground that disclosure would violate Swiss law. Before a final answer to these
petitions was issued, the Swiss Federal Attorney confiscated the records. 357 U.S.
at 200.
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and (2) whether and how to fashion judicial sanctions for failure
to produce." The Court stressed that each consideration was distinct and to be decided on a case-by-case basis, thus limiting17the
holding of the case to the particular facts under consideration. It

held for plaintiff, characterizing its failure to produce as an
"inability fostered neither by its own conduct nor by circumstances within its control."' 8 The Court based its decision on findings
that: (1) the plaintiffs fear of Swiss prosecution was valid, and
hence a reasonable excuse for nonproduction; 9 (2) the plaintiff had
made all the good faith efforts which could be expected of a reasonable person under the circumstances; 0 and (3) that there was no
evidence indicating collusion between the plaintiff and the Swiss
government." The opinion cautioned that the question of good
faith bore no relation to the fact of noncompliance or to the propriety of an order to produce, and was relevant only to the decision
regarding appropriate sanctions. 22 Subsequent decisions interpreting Societ have clouded the Court's distinction between the question of judicial power to order compliance, and the question of how
to determine appropriate sanctions for noncompliance.

3

Courts

16. 357 U.S. at 205, 206.
17. Id. at 205.
18. Id. at 211. In holding the records to be within the plaintiff's control within
the meaning of Rule 34, the Court noted the "vital influence" which the records
might have on the litigation and the fact that the Swiss plaintiff would be in an
"advantageous position to plead with its own sovereign" for waiver of the penal
laws inhibiting disclosure. Id. at 205.
19. Id. at 211.
20. The plaintiff had made extensive efforts at compliance with the order,
producing over 190,000 documents with the consent of the Swiss government, and
had drafted a compromise plan for further compliance which the Swiss government approved but the United States District Court and Court of Appeals refused
to entertain. Id. at 203.
21. The Court found no evidence in support of the United States government's
contention that the plaintiff had played a conspiratorial role in the seizure of the
documents by the Swiss government. Id. at 208, 209.
22. Id. at 208. The Court also noted that curtailment of a party's rights for
inability to comply with a discovery order, despite good faith efforts, raised the
question of whether such action deprived the party of fifth amendment due process. The opinion did not attempt to resolve the constitutional issue.
23. In Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1960), the court refused to
enforce a subpoena duces tecum rqquesting Canadian banking records, on the
ground that the American defendant had met "the exception of illegality under
foreign law . . .", merely by showing that production would violate Canadian

law. In First Nat'l City Bank of New York v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 1969),
a case concerning production of branch bank records located in Panama, the court
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have often reduced the subtle balancing of variables prescribed
under the Societ$ case-by-case approach to oversimplified formulas. 24 Deference to vague principles of international comity have
superseded considerations of competing national policies and the
interests of particular parties.25 In response to this misinterpretation of precedent, the 1965 Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States reiterated the underlying assumption of Societ-the fact that a discovery order might require
an individual to violate the laws of a foreign country did not in
itself preclude courts from issuing production orders. 21 In accord
with the Societ6 approach to the discovery dilemma, 27 the
Restatement urged states to mitigate individual hardship resulting
from imposition of noncompliance sanctions when certain factors
indicate a valid excuse for nonproduction, such as evidence of a
party's compliance with portions of a discovery request not subject
to nondisclosure regulations, or of a party's attempt to obtain
waivers consenting to release of affected records.28 Publication of
noted that had Panama's nondisclosure laws applied to the defendant American
bank so as to subject it to penalty for disclosure, "production of the Panama
records should not be ordered." See also In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d
611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962); Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S.
Antitrust Litigation: Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign
Illegality Excuse for Non-Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 753 (1974).
24. Note, supra note 23, at 750.
25. See 271 F.2d at 619.
26. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREiGN RErxrIoNs LAW OF THE UNiTFD STATES
§ 39 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]:
Inconsistent Requirements Do Not Affect Jurisdiction
(1) A state having jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law is not
precluded from exercising its jurisdiction solely because such exercise requires a person to engage in conduct subjecting him to liability under the
law of another state having jurisdiction with respect to that conduct.
27. See Arthur Anderson & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d at 341.
28. RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 40:
Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law, and
the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of
a person, each state is required by international law to consider, in good
faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light
of such factors as
(a) vital interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory
of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
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the Restatement was followed by indications that the bias against
issuing discovery orders offensive to foreign law was diminishing
in the face of increased legislative and judicial support of broad
and effective discovery techniques. The 1970 amendment to Rule
37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated proof of
willfulness as a prerequisite to punishing failures to comply with
discovery orders,2 rendering sheer inability to produce no barrier
to invocation of Rule 37 noncompliance remedies. Recent decisions
have emphasized facts encouraging stringent enforcement of discovery orders, such as materiality of information sought,3" and the
degree to which a corporation enjoyed the privileges and protections of United States law.31 In antitrust cases in particular, courts
have tended toward strict enforcement of discovery orders, and the
law of the forum concept has emerged as the dominant approach
to jurisdictional conflicts.32

III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

The instant decision termed the district court's finding of contempt and its imposition of sanction for Rio Algom's failure to fully
comply with the Westinghouse discovery request an abuse of discretion, and reversed both orders. The court labeled "clearly erroneous$3 3 the lower court's findings that neither Rio Algom nor its
president had made a diligent effort at compliance, and that no
justification existed to excuse the failure. It further charged the
district court with failure to weigh competing national interests as
prescribed under the Societe case-by-case approach.34 Expressly
recognizing the distinction drawn in Societ6 between the issuance
of compliance orders and the imposition of proper sanctions for
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably
be expected to achieve compliance by that state.
29. The 1970 amendment of Rule 37 eliminated the distinction between
"refusal" and "failure" to comply, classifying all noncompliance as simple failure
to produce. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2281, at 755 n.18 (1970).
30. See Trade Development Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d
Cir. 1972).
31. See Note, supra note 23, at 763 n.66.
32. See id. at 755. See also United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d
897, 903 (2d Cir. 1968); American Jndus. Contracting, Inc. v. Johns-Mansville
Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879, 880 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
33. 563 F.2d at 998.
34. The court charged that "the district court's reasoning was that the law of
the forum would prevail, regardless of the particular facts of the case." Id. at 999.
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failure to comply, the court first examined Rio Algom's behavior
according to the criteria relied upon by the Court in that case. On
the question of good faith, the court characterized Rio Algom's
efforts at compliance as both diligent and timely., The court noted
that the company had made all efforts to produce those records not
subject to nondisclosure regulations, placing the emphasis on Rio
Algom's request to the Canadian government for a waiver authorizing release of restricted documents." The court took notice of
the strong criminal sanctions" which the company would suffer for
release of restricted information, and dismissed as unsupported
allegations of collusion between Rio Algom and the Canadian government. The court then cited sections 39 and 40 of the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States as a source of guidance in balancing the interests of the two
nations whose laws the controversy involved." Noting the physical
location of the records stored at Rio Algom's Toronto offices, the
court deemed legitimate the national security concerns expressed
in the Supreme Court of Ontario's denial of Westinghouse's letters
rogatory10 The court concluded that the United States' obvious
interest in affording litigants adequate discovery did not in this
case outweigh Canada's need to control matters affecting national
security." It noted, moreover, that Westinghouse's defense did not
depend on enforcement of the discovery order directed at Rio
Algom, as its claim of price-fixing was based on cumulative evidence obtained from a variety of uranium concerns. Finally, Rio
Algom's enjoyment of the privileges of incorporation under domestic law was not regarded as adequate cause to hold it to an absolute
duty of disclosure in view of more significant factors under consid35. The district court had found Rio Algom's request for waiver tardy, although it had been made prior to the contempt hearing. Id. at 998.
36. See note 5 supra.
37. Canadian law provided for imposition of a $5-10,000 fine, two to five years
imprisonment or both for violation of the Uranium Security Regulations. See 563
F.2d at 996.
38. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Doyle echoed Westinghouse's suggestion
that Rio Algom had acted in collusion with the Canadian government in effecting
promulgation of the nondisclosure regulations. Id. at 1001 (dissent).
39. Id. at 997.
40. See note 7 supra.
41. The court implied, however, that under other circumstances, competing
national interests in a discovery dispute might weigh out differently, noting that

the case at hand involved neither a grand jury investigation nor direct enforcement of antitrust laws. 563 F.2d at 999.
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eration. The court decided that in view of Rio Algom's good faith
efforts at compliance with the discovery order, the unyielding defense of the Uranium Security Regulations by Canadian courts and
administrative authorities, and Westinghouse's access to alternative evidence compensating for Rio Algom's inability to produce,
no sanctions for noncompliance should be imposed.
IV.

COMMENT

As prosecution of multinational corporations for antitrust violations becomes more frequent,"2 refinement of criteria for resolving
discovery stalemates is essential, both to successful enforcement
and to the maintenance of friendly diplomatic relations. The instant opinion combines a valuable clarification of the case-by-case
approach outlined in Societ6 with a responsible expansion of that
precedent through integration of the balancing factors in sections
39 and 40 of the Restatement, thus providing needed guidance for
the resolution of international discovery disputes. However, the
court's explicit recognition that the instant case did not involve
direct enforcement of United States antitrust laws suggests an
awareness of the limitations of the Societ6 doctrine."3 Whenever
possible, courts are apt to resolve discovery controversies on narrow factual or procedural grounds, rather than appraise the competing national interests which often lie at the heart of these disputes." Neither judicial precedent nor the Restatement can equip
courts to perform the essentially diplomatic function of accommodating national interests drawn into conflict by requests for disclosure. Attempts by American courts to force compliance with discovery orders which controvert nondisclosure laws protecting sensitive prerogatives of foreign states run the risk of appearing to be
conscious impingements on national sovereignty. 5 Moreover, differing national views of the proper role of discovery raise questions
of policy which fall more appropriately within the purview of the
State Department than that of courts." Particularly difficult chal42. See Hollmann, Problems of ObtainingEvidence in Antitrust Litigation:
Comparative Approaches to the Multinational Corporation, 11 TEX. J. INT'L L.
461 (1976).
43. See Note, supra note 23, at 755.

44. Id.
45. See note 7 supra.

46. In Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland [1956] 1 All E.R. 549, 554, Lord
Goddard, C.J., commented on the United States procedural rule allowing discov-

ery requests reasonably calculated to produce admissible evidence: "That is what
we should call a fishing proceeding, which is never allowed in the English courts."
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lenges to courts would be cases in which meritorious allegations of
bad faith were raised regarding a foreign state's promulgation or
application of nondisclosure laws.47 Courts would then be torn between the unsavory prospect of punishing individuals for good
faith inability to comply, and the political necessity of imposing
such noncompliance sanctions in support of a strong enforcement
policy. In addition to the possibility that certain discovery controversies are fundamentally nonjusticiable, considerations of expense and timely adjudication counsel against allowing discovery
disputes to stymie international antitrust litigation. Arbitration of
international discovery disputes through the appointment of neutral masters assigned to examine restricted documents for legitimate protectionism might be an alternative to complete denial of
disclosure. However, nations may balk at the alternative of binding arbitration since discovery controversies often implicate prerogatives of sovereignty which national authorities are loathe to
relinquish. Any effective reconciliation of the conflict between liberal American discovery procedures and the reluctance of foreign
governments to concede such broad disclosure must come in the
form of specific international agreements squarely addressing the
problem.4" Courts have in the past circumvented the fundamentally political dilemma of accommodating competing national policies by drafting narrow decisions based on factual or procedural
grounds peculiar to a given case. International procedural disputes
are essentially political in nature, and the discovery dilemma requires diplomatic, not judicial, resolution.
Sue D. Sheridan
47.

Findings of collusion on the part of the party claiming inability to comply

pose no difficulty for courts, since evidence of bad faith dissolves any reason to
withold compliance orders or to mitigate noncompliance sanctions.

48. For a discussion of prior attempts to develop international civil procedure,
see Note, supra note 23, at 770-74.

TREATIES-DRUGS AND NARCOTICS-SINGLE CONVENTION ON
NARCOTIC DRUGS PERMITS THE UNITED STATES TO PLACE
RESTRICTIONS ON SEPARATED MARIJuANA LEAVES

FEwER

I. FACTS AND HOLDING
The National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws
(NORML) I petitioned 2 the Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) 3 to decontrol marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 4 or alternatively, to transfer the
substance from Schedule I to Schedule V5 under the CSA. The
Director refused to accept the petition for filing,' stating that control of marijuana was required pursuant to the Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs (Single Convention).' The Director claimed that
section 201(d) of the CSA8 gave him sole authority for the scheduling of controlled substances governed by the treaty. NORML appealed, contending that section 201(d) required that scheduling
under the CSA be in conformity with the minimal requirements of
the Single Convention. NORML asserted that the treaty does not
impose severe restrictions upon the separatedleaves of the canna1. Joining NORML in this petition were the Institute for the Study of Health
and Society, and the American Public Health Association.
2. The petition was dated May 18, 1972.
3. Pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act, § 501(a), 21 U.S.C. § 871(a)
(1976), the Attorney General delegated his functions under the act to the BNDD,
a bureau within the Department of Justice.
4. The CSA is Title Il of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1235, and is codified in pertinent
part, as amended, in 21 U.S.C. § 801-904 (1976).
5. Schedule I drugs are defined as drugs with no currently accepted medical
use in treatment and having a high potential for abuse. Schedule V drugs have a
currently accepted medical use in treatment and have a low potential for abuse
relative to drugs in Schedules I, II, I or IV. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1976).
6. 37 Fed. Reg. 18097 (1972).
7. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, opened for signatureMarch 30, 1961,
18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (effective for the United
States June 24, 1967) [hereinafter cited as Single Convention].
8. Section 201(d) of the CSA provides:
If control is required by United States obligations under international treaties, conventions, or protocols in effect on the effective date of this part, the
Attorney General shall issue an order controlling such drug under the schedule he deems most appropriate to carry out such obligations, without regard
to the findings required by subsection (a) of this section or section 202(b)
and without regard to the procedures prescribed by subsections (a) and (b)
of this section.
21 U.S.C. § 811(d) (1976).
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bis plant, but regulates only the flowering or fruited tops and the
resin of the plant.' NORML would require that the question of
removing the leaves from CSA controls be referred to the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare for a scientific and medical
evaluation of the substance, pursuant to the referral procedure
found in section 201(a)-(c) of the CSA. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals'" reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings. The court expressed dissatisfaction with the
Director's position that even though the treaty might require no
more control than Schedule V, he could insist on Schedule I without adhering to the referral mechanisms of the CSA."1 The Department of Justice was required to conduct hearings 2 regarding the
amount of latitude permitted consistent with United States treaty
obligations in scheduling marijuana and separate marijuana
leaves. 3 A second phase of the hearing was required to determine
the operation of the referral mechanism of section 201. 4 The hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 5 determined that, consistent with the Single Convention, "cannabis" and "cannabis
resin"-as defined by the treaty-could be rescheduled to CSA
Schedule II, cannabis leaves could be rescheduled to CSA Schedule V, and cannabis seeds could be decontrolled. The Judge rejected the government's interpretation of section 201(d) of the
CSA, holding that the agency should follow the referral and hearing procedures of section 201(a)-(c). DEA's Acting Administrator,"
however, denied NORML's petition, 7 stating that regardless of the
interpretation of the Single Convention, marijuana could not be
removed from Schedule I since the acting Assistant Secretary of
9.

See Single Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(b), (c).

10. NORML v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974). A reorganization
within the Department of Justice occurred while this case was pending, causing
the action to be continued against the Director of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
11. Id. at 660-61.
12. The court indicated that a rejection of plaintiffs' petition would only be
proper after a hearing on the merits, and that the premature rejection after the
filing of the petition was improper. Id. at 659.

13.

Id. at 660.

14.

Id. at 661 n.17.

15. Ad. L.J. Lewis F. Parker.
16. The functions vested in the Attorney General by the CSA have been
delegated to DEA's Acting Administrator pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.100, 0.132(d)
(1976).
17. 40 Fed. Reg. 44164, 44168 (1975).

18. See note 5 supra.
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Health had indicated in a letter that there was no accepted medical use of marijuana in the United States." The Acting Administrator determined that this letter satisfied the referral procedures
of section 201(a)-(c) of the CSA. 0 On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Held: Since United States treaty
obligations under the Single Convention would permit separated
marijuana leaves to be rescheduled in CSA Schedule V, the Acting
Administrator must request a medical and scientific evaluation
from the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in order to
place marijuana leaves in a more restrictive schedule. National
Organizationfor Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Drug
Enforcement Administration, 559 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Single Convention, completed by the United Nations in
1961, replaced all previous multilateral treaties 1 designed to control the use and traffic of specified drugs. 2 The Single Convention
was an endeavor to obligate signatory states to pass legislative and
administrative measures necessary to limit the production, manufacture, import, export, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs.2 The amount of control required with respect to
various drugs depends on their placement in one or more schedules, numbered I-IV, 24 reflecting a decreasing degree of harmful-

ness and control restrictions. In its definitional section, the Single
Convention defines "cannabis"2 5 as "the flowering or fruited tops
19. Letter from Dr. Theodore Cooper, Acting Ass't Sec'y of Health, to the
Drug Enforcement Administration, reprinted in 40 Fed. Reg. 44,165 (1975). Ad.
L.J. Parker had refused to weigh the impact of Dr. Cooper's letter and requested
a specific opinion from the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

20. Id. at 44,165.
21. Single Convention, supra note 7, art. 44.
22. The first international effort was made by the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909. The first international narcotics convention, the International
Opium Convention, signed January 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912 (1912), T.S. No. 612,
8 L.N.T.S. 187, was completed at the Hague in 1912. For synposes of these and
subsequent efforts, see Bassiouni, The InternationalNarcotics Control System:
A Proposal, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 713 (1972); Waddell, InternationalNarcotics
Control, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 310 (1970).
23. Single Convention, supra note 7, art. 4.
24. Schedule I drugs are subject to all measures of control available under the

Single Convention. Id. art. 2,
25.

1.

Cannabissativa is the species description of marijuana.
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of the cannabis plant (excluding the seeds and leaves when not
accompanied by the tops).""8 "Cannabis resin" is defined as "the
separated resin . . . obtained from the cannabis plant."-*, Thus,

the Single Convention excludes separated leaves from the definition of cannabis and cannabis resin. Cannabis and cannabis resin
are placed in Schedule I by the Single Convention.18 Article 2,
paragraph 7 recognizes this distinction between cannabis and separated leaves when it provides that cannabis leaves are subject to
the control measures of article 28. Article 28 requires that "[tihe
Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to prevent
the misuse of, and illicit traffic in, the leaves of the cannabis
plant."2 The Single Convention was a major influence on the
United States Congress" when the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970' was passed. This Act attempted to incorporate a series of prior regulatory and enforcement
statutes which dealt with drug control."' Title II of the Act, dealing
exclusively with control and regulation of drugs, is cited as the
Controlled Substances Act. 3 The CSA parallels the organization
of the Single Convention in several instances. In the CSA, five
schedules of controlled substances u are established, 3 reflecting
decreasing degrees of control and regulation of drugs. The CSA
placed various drugs into these schedules," but provided the mech26. Single Convention, supra note 7, art. 1, 1(b) (emphasis added).
27. Id. art. 1, 1(d).
28. See id. Schedule 1.
29. Id. art. 28, 3. The leaves were placed in this category because of the
belief that they do not contain as much of the "narcotic substance" as the flowers
and resin of the cannabis plant. Conference for Adoption of a Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs, U.N. ESCOR, Vol. II, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 34/24/add. 1, at
174-75 (1961).
30. Section 107(7) of the CSA declares: "The United States is a party to the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 ...

designed to establish effective

control over international and domestic traffic in controlled substances." 21
U.S.C. § 801(7) (1976).
Other sections of the CSA which refer to the Single Convention are §§ 201(d),
202(b), and 303(a) (codified in 21 U.S.C. §§ 811(d), 912(b), 823(a) (1976)).
31. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1976)).
32. Sections 1, 2, 3, 701, 1101, and 1102 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 repeal or amend at least a dozen previous
federal statutes and portions of the Internal Revenue Code.
33. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 100, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
34. Section 102(6) of the CSA defines "controlled substance" as a "drug or
other substance" included in one of the schedules. 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (1976).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 812(a) (1976).
36. Id. at § 812(c).
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anism whereby substances could be added to, or transferred between, the schedules. 3 This mechanism is found in section 201 of
the CSA, and its interpretation is the major conflict between
NORML and DEA. Section 201(a) empowers the Attorney General
to add to or transfer"8 between schedules any drug upon which he
finds to have a potential for abuse and is eligible for inclusion in
one of the schedules. 9 Before the Attorney General follows the
rules and hearing requirements of section 201(a), he must request
a scientific and medical evaluation from the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare, as provided for in section 201(b). The
Secretary's recommendations are binding upon the Attorney General as to factors within the Secretary's expertise."0 The key provision is section 201(d)." The BNDD and DEA interpret section
201(d) as not requiring a report from the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare whenever control of a substance is required
by international obligations, and further, as allowing the Attorney
General to place a substance in the schedule he considers appropriate.42 NORML maintains that international obligations impose a
37. Id. at § 811. Marijuana as defined by § 102(15) of the CSA is placed in
Schedule I [hallucinogenic substances] by the CSA. Id. § 812, Schedule I(c)(10).
This schedule was updated and republished in 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d) (1977).
38. The Attorney General may remove a substance from a schedule if he finds
that the substance does not meet the requirements for inclusion in any schedule.
21 U.S.C. § 811(a)(2) (1976).
39. The schedules reflect the amount of control placed on a substance according to (a) the potential for abuse, (b) whether or not the substance has a currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, and (c) the extent of
psychological or physical dependence which may accompany the use of the substance. See id. § 812(b). This is very similar to the Single Convention method of
classification. See Lessem, Toward An InternationalSystem of Drug Control, 8
MICH. J.L. REF. 103, 134 (1974).
40. 21 U.S.C. § 811(b) (1976). Section 201(c) outlines the various factors to
be considered in the placement of the substance. Id. § 811(c).
41. See note 8 supra.
42. DEA cites as supportive of this position statements made in a report of
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce analyzing what was then the
proposed CSA. These statements read:
Under subsection (d), where control of a drug or other substance by the
United States is required by reason of its obligations under an international
treaty, convention, or protocol ....

the bill does not require that the

Attorney General seek an evaluation and recommendation by the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare, or pursue the procedures for control
prescribed by the bill but he may include the drug or other substance under
any of the five schedules of the bill which he considers most appropriate to
carry out the obligations of the United States under the international in-
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floor on the amount of control required, and asserts that section
201(d) recognizes the necessity of the referral mechanism of section
201(b).11

III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

In the instant case, the court of appeals agreed that the Single
Convention permits a significant degree of latitude with respect to
the scheduling of the various parts of the marijuana plant under
the CSA. The court first adopted NORML's position that section
201(d) of the CSA requires the Attorney General to seek the recommendations of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
even as to drugs controlled by international obligations. First, the
court emphasized the congressional scheme which limited the Attorney General's authority to make scheduling decisions under the
CSA and enabled HEW to preserve its input. Second, the court
pointed out that DEA's reading of section 201(d)-that is, if any
amount of control was required with respect to a particular substance under the Single Convention, then the Attorney General
can forego the referral procedures-would be an absurd reading of
that section insofar as the list of drugs included in the Single
Convention nearly parallels those found in the CSA, and thus the
referral mechanisms would become meaningless. The court found
that such a reading would destroy the balance of power created by
Congress in this matter. The proper procedure, said the court,
would be for the Attorney General to make a legal judgment as to
the minimum level of control required by international obligations,
and to request a report from the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare. The Secretary, after making medical and scientific
strument, and he may do so without making the specific findings otherwise
required for inclusion of a drug or other substance in that schedule.
H.R. REP. No. 91-1444 (Part 1), '91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1970).
43. The Senate recognized that the Justice Department may not have the
expertise to reschedule drugs "since such decisions require special medical knowledge and training." S. REP. No. 91-613, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969). The Senate
thus provided in its original version of the CSA, S. 1895, that the Attorney General seek advice from the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare on all
scheduling matters. Quoting from the same House Report as DEA, see note 42
supra, NORML argued that Congress intended a balance of decision-making in
the process, allowing the Attorney General to consider law enforcement criteria,
while the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare would make decisions
concerning scientific and medical data, those decisions to be binding on the
Attorney General. See H. REP. No. 91-1444 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23
(1970).
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findings,44 could recommend placement of the substance. The instant court stated that the Acting Assistant Secretary of Health's
letter would not satisfy the requirement of an elaborate factfinding medical inquiry by the Secretary of HEW. The court remarked that Dr. Cooper's conclusory statements about the lack of
a medical use for marijuana may run counter to other HEW reports" and consequently, a formal referral and hearing by HEW is
required. On the issue of how much control was required by the
Single Convention, the court interpreted the treaty, concluding
that "cannabis" and "cannabis resin" could be placed in a minimum CSA Schedule II, while cannabis leaves and seeds could be
contained in a minimum CSA Schedule V. The parties agreed and
the Acting Administrator had held that "cannabis" and "cannabis
resin" as defined by the Single Convention could be rescheduled
to CSA Schedule II consistent with the Single Convention, thereby
preventing the limiting of these substances for research only. The
court then spoke of the sufficiency of CSA Schedule V with respect
to the separated leaves. The Single Convention does not require
that the leaves be dispensed only by prescription. Article 28, paragraph 3 of the Single Convention merely requires that certain measures be taken to prevent the misuse and illicit traffic in, the leaves
of the cannabis plant. Thus, the court found that the Single Convention would allow the United States to place separated leaves in
CSA Schedule V. The court concluded that the Acting Administrator of DEA must refer NORML's petition to the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare for his evaluations and recommendations as to the placement of cannabis and cannabis leaves, and
that these recommendations will be binding to the extent that they
meet the minimum requirements of the Single Convention.
IV.

COMMENT

The instant case is a study in the interpretation of a scheme of
administrative procedure. The problem was in reconciling existing
law under a multilateral treaty with a congressional statute.
Clearly, scheduling decisions under the CSA are meant to consider
various factors such as medical evidence and law enforcement.
44. Both DEA and HEW have interpreted section 201(b) of the CSA to bar
DEA from exceeding the level of control recommended by HEW. See 559 F.2d at
738 n.11.

45. 559 F.2d at 749 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS, MARIJUANA AND HEALTH (1975)).
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Congress recognized that certain factors depended on expert analysis from government departments, and it is with this view that the
Attorney General is required to seek binding recommendations
from the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare on the scientific and medical aspects of a substance. This balance of power
approach seems crucial to a workable understanding of the CSA.
Additionally, the CSA recognizes the obligations imposed on the
United States by treaties and other conventions. The most coherent interpretation of section 201 of the CSA is that adopted by the
instant court-that is, that the Single Convention places minimum obligations on signatory states who may pass more stringent
legislation as they see fit. In the United States, this would indicate
that the Attorney General must first determine what minimum
obligations are imposed by the Single Convention. He must then
refer the petition for rescheduling to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare who may determine that more control is necessary than specified in the Single Convention. Because, so many
drugs appearing in the CSA are already listed in the Single Convention, a contrary reading of section 201 would allow the Attorney
General to bypass the referral mechanism in almost every case.
Presently, the Acting Administrator of DEA is awaiting the recommendations of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
before ruling on NORML's Petition.46 Placement of cannabis
leaves in Schedule I by the Secretary would, of course, foreclose the
issue. In the event the Secretary places the leaves in a less restrictive schedule, DEA will probably appeal the instant court's decision. Eventually, there is likely to be a partial decontrol and decriminalization of marijuana,4 7 but this is a slow process, and may
require congressional action. This is so because DEA appears intent on preventing the rescheduling of marijuana. A re-control of
marijuana may be the most logical solution to this dispute. A
system whereby marijuana is decriminalized and at the same time
taxed and regulated would be a realistic approach. Marijuana is
constantly smuggled into the United States with law enforcement
attempts having little effect on the flow. Presently, the public's
appetite for marijuana is satisfied by those who face the risk of
46. See Controlled Substances Advisory Committee Meetings transcripts.
47. Because the Single Convention requires at least some control over separated cannabis leaves, legalization of marijuana is inconsistent with United
States' obligations under the Convention. See Leinwand, The InternationalLaw
of Treaties and United States Legalizationof Marijuana,10 COLUM. J. TRAmSNAT'L
L. 413, 416 (1971).
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criminal sanctions. Government regulation would obviate the necessity for this source of supply and at the same time, would insure
against the introduction of harmful additives to marijuana, such
as paraquat, a type of herbicide used in Mexico. The alcohol industry presents the closest analogy to this proposed solution. Licensed
companies processing separated cannabis leaves would permit the
United States to impose penalties on the use or distribution of
flowering tops outside of regulated channels, and thus comply with
the Single Convention. In addition, marijuana would be cleared for
any of its probable medical uses. The instant case cleared the way
for this approach by recognizing the latitude permitted by treaty
obligations.
Steven M. Morgan

